being what it is, implies not only a subjective experience, but also, and necessarily, a course of conduct. Thus, this particular esthetic standard refers directly to the propriety of acts, which, in turn, refers directly to the circumstances attending these acts. From the esthetic standpoint, therefore, "obscenity" in literature and the arts-far from referring to what an individual might be induced to do refers to representations or suggestions of behavior so contrary to an individual's sense of propriety in sexual matters as to cause "shock or disgust." But again, what appears to be an outrage to one person might, to another. be a matter of entire acceptance, or of complete indifference. It can be easily derived from this that we cannot objectify "obscenity" through esthetic judgments any more than we can through any other kind of judgment; nevertheless, the terms "shock," or "disgust" seem to form a much more realistic basis for legal determinations than the terms "deprave" or "corrupt," since through the former terms, an injury can be asserted.

The general question remains: should "obscenity" in literature and the arts, even as an esthetic category, be an object of criminal statutes? The only conceivable answer to this is, that to the extent that "shock or disgust" are injuries, then the public has every right to protect itself, through its penal codes, against such injury. But it is clear that complaints and prosecutions of obscenity, as esthetic offenses, would run a much different course, and require a considerably different kind of proof, than if handled as offenses against public morals, as they chiefly are at present. It might at first appear that by shifting the grounds of judgment in "obscenity" from the moral to the esthetic, a considerable handicap would be placed upon those whose job it is to police public behavior and display.

one

The very reverse, in fact, would be true. All that a censor would have to assert is that, for esthetic reasons, "this or that is simply not done, or displayed, in public," without having to become involved in uncertain or irrelevant moral issues.

The trial of "Lady Chatterley's Lover" was not, at least in England, the consequence of postal censorship, although there is no reason why it could not have been, had the initial distribution of this publication been through postal egencies. Postal regulations concerning "obscenity" merely reflect already existing statutes on the subject, and the powers of postal censorship are merely an extension of similar powers vested in other public agencies. No matter how we try to narrow our subject to the limits of postal activities, or of literature and the graphic arts as such, we find it so much involved with related fields that it is impossible to isolate it from the larger issues. In the field of criminal law, these larger issues are summed up in the questions: should "obscenity" in literature and the arts be defined in moral, or esthetic terms, or both? In what respects does such "obscenity" present a public danger which should be forbidden under criminal statutes? In the field of our own constitutional government, the basic question becomes: is government censorship of privately communicated and privately-used literature or artistic materials, of any kind, a violation of the people's rights under our Constitution's Bill of Rights?

It does not seem likely that such general questions will be resolved in the immediate future; and it may very well be that Postal Regulations will afford the first test of the constitutionality of censorship of "obscene" literary or artistic matter of different sorts and by different agencies. The American public can always change its laws, when it is sufficiently

16